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TESTIMONY OF HERBERT R. NORTHRUP 
PREPARED FOR 
THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. 
September 8, 1994 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission: 
I requested the opportunity to be heard because, having 
studied, researched, and written about union tactics for more than 
fifty years, I am concerned that the Commission has not given the 
same attention to union policies and tactics as it has to those of 
management. I am today concentrating on tactics known as "union 
corporate campaigns" and "inside games," which I believe the record 
demonstrates have an adverse impact on companies, their 
managements, and the employees involved. My testimony is based upon 
the research which I did for the article, "Union Corporate 
Campaigns and Inside Games As a Strike Form," copies of which I 
have also brought for the Commission. The article provides a much 
fuller explanation of my views than time allocated here can permit. 
My key sources are publications of unions and union adherents and 
comments attributed to union officials or staff, all of which are 
cited in the article. 
Union Corporate Campaigns 
The tactics utilized in the corporate campaign involve 
publicity and direct confrontation, attacking the company and its 
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management at every possible relationship and to all possible 
sources of opinion generation, including members of the board of 
directors, stockholders, vendors, dealers, investment bankers, 
government officials and agencies in this country and abroad, 
customers and potential customers in this country and abroad, the 
press including television and radio, opinion leaders such as 
college faculty and students, and the general public so as to 
decrease the confidence in the company's products and therefore, 
adversely affect its sales and profits. 
The purpose of the corporate campaign is typically to attempt 
to alter the resistance of the company to union demands by casting 
company management and its products in disrepute among all its 
possible constituencies and to impugn management to ^ employees so 
that they will be willing to pursue destructive actions, thereby 
reducing production quantity and quality, adversely affecting sales 
and profits, and if possible, causing a change to a management more 
willing to meet union demands. 
According to the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department (IUD): 
A coordinated corporate campaign applies pressure to many 
points of [corporate] vulnerability to convince the company 
to deal fairly and equitably [from the union's point of view] 
with the union ... It means vulnerabilities in all of the 
company's political and economic relationships — with other 
unions, shareholders, customers, creditors, and government 
agencies — to achieve union goals. 
Richard Leonard, who directs corporate campaigns for the Oil, 
Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCAW), adds this: 
A part of what a corporate campaign does is not only 
to organize our side, but to disorganize management.... 
Companies are by definition organized. They operate by 
command.... 
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When we turn their tactics around and disorganize 
management, we find that as this takes place, it has 
the reverse effect of organizing ourselves.... 
According to Ray Rogers, who claims to have initiated 
corporate campaign strategies: 
"...we develop a campaign strategy that has a 
beginning point A and an end point Z. Point Z is 
total defeat or annihilation of your adversary." In 
reality, few, if any, campaigns reach point Z. "You 
have got to develop a plan such that you feel totally 
confident that if you proceed from Point A towards Point 
Z, there is a breaking point or point of compromise, a 
Point C. But there has to be an escalation of the fight, 
you have to create more tension...." 
A Troublemaker's Handbook affirms the Rogers upscaling of a 
labor dispute in which a corporate campaign is utilized by 
declaring that such campaigns "are effective when they inflict 
costly consequences on the target company or its allies." 
Corporate campaign strategy calls for use of federal and state 
regulatory agencies as a means of pressuring companies with mass 
filings, charges, and complaints regardless of their merits. The 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) , are major recipients of such tactics, but so are 
other federal and state agencies: 
Both public institutions and private companies 
are subject to all sorts of laws and regulations, 
from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, from the Civil 
Rights Act to the local fire codes. Every law or 
regulation is a potential net in which management 
can be snared and entangled. A complaint to a 
regulatory agency can cause the company managerial 
time, public embarrassment, potential fines, and 
the costs of compliance^ One well-placed phone call 
can do a lot of damage. 
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Corporate campaigns had been found to be most effective 
against companies which sell directly to the public, and less 
effective against those that sell primarily to other companies. 
This, combined with the increased willingness of workers to cross 
picket lines, led unions to develop the inside game. 
The Inside Game and its Combination with the Corporate Campaign 
The tactics utilized in the inside game include efforts to 
convince employees to impede or to disrupt production by slowing 
the work pace, refusing to work overtime, refusing to do work 
without receiving minute instructions from supervisors or 
management even though workers have heretofore not needed such 
instruction to have been able to perform their jobs, and have 
actually been well aware of how to perform their jobs without such 
instructions, filing mass charges with government agencies, filing 
mass grievances, castigating management and supervision both within 
and without the plant, starting false rumors of doubt or claims of 
unfairness, pressuring those in disagreement to go along with, or 
to refrain from questioning such policies, engaging in sick outs, 
hit-and-run strikes affecting different areas of the plant, and 
generally attempting to build a climate in which reasonable worker-
management relationships, worker-management cooperation, and normal 
quality and quantity of production cannot exist. Where there is an 
integrated combination of the corporate campaign and the inside 
game, the tactics are designed to increase the potential that 
employees will be willing to participate in the inside game and to 
inhibit the normal operation of the workplace. 
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The purpose of the inside game is typically to increase costs 
of production of the company's products by inducing employees to 
reduce productivity, efficiency and quality, thereby limiting the 
company's ability to meet customers' needs and reducing sales and 
profits. 
From this summary description of the purpose of the corporate 
campaign and inside game combination, it is clear that it is 
designed to result in a curtailment of productive activity and 
output thereby creating a situation that is in fact a form of 
strike in which the employees may reduce production, hurt sales, 
undermine the effectiveness of management, and otherwise create a 
strike situation except that the employees continue to receive 
compensation for services either not, or only nominally, rendered, 
and the union is not required to pay strike benefits or other union 
strike expenses to sustain the strikers. The aim is to damage sales 
by damaging the reputation, stock price, and income of the company, 
and ultimately by inducing the labor force to become radically 
antagonistic to management and thereby to become open to cutting 
the quantity and quality of production even if one end result is 
to threaten the existence of the workers' own jobs. Just as 
slowdowns or sit-down strikes have long been found to be forms of 
strike, so is the corporate campaign and inside game combination, 
by any realistic analysis, seen to be a strike form. 
Inside Game — Tactics in Practice 
The key tactics commonly utilized in the inside game are as 
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follows: 
1. Symbolic demonstrations of solidarity — dress, buttons, tapping 
pencils, standing in place, etc. 
2. Massive grievance filings "over every possible contract 
violation." 
3. Avoiding all contacts or conversation with supervisory 
employees. 
4. Utilizing warlike and fighting terminology. 
5. Directing warlike literature and activities against company 
chief executive and other management personnel. 
6. Picketing company offices and residences of chief executive and 
other management personnel. 
7. Ridiculing management personnel. 
8. Isolating and ridiculing workers who decline to support union 
policies. 
9. Doing job under a "work-to-rule" formula, leaving one's brains 
behind, thereby engaging in fact in a slowdown. 
10. Sabotage. 
11. Refusing to work overtime. 
12. Hit-and-run strikes, "sick outs," strikes by key personnel, 
general short strikes, and other direct forms of striking. 
13. Direct actions against employees who fail to participate in 
"work-to-rule," (sabotage), as well as discrimination against them 
and their families. 
14. Calling attention to foreign ownership where it exists, 
disparaging foreign owner, and pressuring such owners through union 
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international relationships. 
15. Attempt to eliminate all cooperative labor management 
activities, such as quality control programs, and even joint 
support of such public support as community chest. 
16. Denigrate management policies even if such policies are adopted 
as a result of employee interest. 
17. Enmesh management in a host of charges before government 
agencies, including NLRB, OSHA, EPA, SEC, federal and state wage 
and hour administrative agencies, local and state governments, and 
any government agency which is a customer of the company targeted. 
18. Conduct polls in order to determine which employees are 
supportive of these tactics, which are opposed, and which are 
leaning one way or the other, and then apply pressure to increase 
support and to punish opposition. 
19. Coordinate all above activities with corporate campaign in 
order to maximize external support and to increase employee support 
by denigrating management, the company, and its products. 
These tactics are discussed in detail in the article supplied 
to you. Two tactics can be illustrative of the inside game in 
practice: "symbolic demonstrations," and "work-to-rule." 
Inside game tactics often commence with "symbolic 
demonstrations of solidarity through such actions as mass wearing 
of buttons, arm bands and T-shirts...," then move to more direct 
tactics. According to the Contract Campaign Manual of the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU): 
The key is escalation — implementing tactics 
one at a time. In the area of job action, for example 
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you can start with something mild like days when all 
workers wear the same color clothing, move to one 
minute moment of solidarity, then to a work to rule 
campaign where every one does only the bare minimum 
required by the existing contract, and finally to 
some form of work stoppage if needed. 
Other practitioners of the inside game agree: 
Although a campaign often begins with "what 
may seem like tame tactics," ... the wearing of arm 
bands or buttons is not as tame as it seems," ... 
[according to Joseph Uehlein who directs corporate campaign 
and inside game policy for the IUD], "An office full of 
employees tapping pencils in unison when a supervisor 
walks through can be quite intimidating," another union 
union representative said. 
Thus, dress and the wearing of special buttons, shirts, 
etc., are not just expressions of free speech, but rather the first 
step in inside game tactics designed for the purpose of, as the 
SEIU Manual notes, "Pressuring the Employer."9 Further, such 
seemingly innocuous tactics, according to the SEIU, have 
significant results: 
It builds members1 confidence and commitment.... 
By escalating tactics, you don't ask them to make 
a leap of faith all at once. Instead, you start with 
an activity that is relatively easy to organize and 
has little risk — but that shows workers that organized 
action is possible. 
Once workers have taken part in one campaign 
activity, many will begin to see the campaign and 
the union as their own. If management responds to, 
say, a petition or rally by refusing to negotiate 
reasonably, workers will begin to see this as an 
insult to them rather than a response to "the union." 
Filled with increased confidence and emotional 
commitment, they will be ready to try the next step. 
(B) Communication Workers of America (CWA) tactics also 
illustrate this point: 
Bargaining unit members wore red every Thursday 
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from the beginning of contract talks in mid-June until 
expiration in early August. Standing in place, tapping, 
and other similar tactics unified the members and let 
the company know that we would not retreat from our 
opposition to cost shifting. 
As expiration drew closer, we escalated our tactics. 
We picketed outside work locations before starting the 
workday with signs that said "Just practicing," and then 
marched into work in unity. We worked to rule. We forgot 
our ID cards at major locations where cards must be pre-
sented to gain entrance. 
About ten days before expiration, we picketed with 
signs that said "Just Practicing" and then marched in seven 
minutes late. We knew we'd struck a nerve at the company 
when, instead of docking employees for a quarter hour of 
lateness, nearly 100 were given one-day suspensions for 
participating in illegal job actions, and thousands more 
received warnings. In some locations, supervisors began to 
threaten workers with warnings and suspensions if they 
refused to stop tapping at their desks or standing in place. 
Work-to-rule is the central tactic of the inside game. The 
v. 
name originated in Britain as an euphemism for a slowdown. As 
practiced in inside game efforts, it involves considerably more 
than simply following work rules in an orderly, intelligent 
fashion. Rather it has come to mean doing the minimum possible, 
doing nothing without minute direction from supervisors, denying 
or evading personal responsibility for doing the job, wasting as 
much time as possible, reducing effort from the normal expected and 
heretofore applied, taking no initiatives to handle problems — in 
effect leaving one's brains, training, and normal work practices 
out of the job. In other words, to "work-to-rule" is actually to 
create a slowdown. 
Sometimes there may be rules that are obsolete, and employees 
are encouraged to follow them in order to claim that they are 
obeying orders despite their knowledge that the rule is obsolete 
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and inefficient, and has been abandoned in normal practice. Thus, 
the SEIU Manual states: 
In many cases, the most powerful workaday tactic 
is for members to do only what they are required to do 
by the union contract and no more. In some workouts, 
this means that workers.... 
• Follow supervisors' instructions to the letter, 
even when those instructions are wrong or the supervisor 
has mistakenly left out key steps. 
• Do not make any suggestions or take it upon them-
selves to solve problems that come up. They wait until 
the supervisor tells them what to do. 
• insist on following all of the employers' rules. 
For example, let's say that to please its insurance 
company the employer has posted safety rules which say 
that "no employee shall lift excessive loads." 
Workers may now decide to strictly enforce this 
rule, insisting on being provided with lifting devices 
or having other workers pulled off their jobs to help 
with excessive lifting. 
• Report every equipment problem and insist that 
it be taken care of before work can proceed. 
These tactics are intended to escalate and "can throw any 
workday into a frenzy," according to Joseph Uehlein of the IUD. 
Uehlein also believes that such tactics do not necessarily rule out 
an eventual traditional strike, but that working-to-rule ensures 
that union members will be "more solidified and more militant" if 
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a walkout ensues. 
To put it another way, work-to-rule requires the employee to 
avoid bringing his education, skill, training, knowledge, and 
effort to the job, thereby decreasing the added value which he is 
paid to put into the product. Yet employee engaged in such tactics 
expect the same wage return for there much more limited work. Thus, 
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employees are engaging in a form of direct action, in other words 
a slowdown, and this action should be treated as such as a matter 
of public policy. 
Impact of Corporate Campaign — Inside Game Combination 
I have used two tactics of the inside game and explained the 
workings of the corporate campaign in the brief time allotted me 
to illustrate how these union tactics work. When one adds the mass 
use of government regulatory bodies as tactical weapons, and the 
other actions listed above which feature corporate campaigns and 
inside games, it is apparent that public policy questions are 
raised. In conclusion, a brief review of the impact of these 
activities on employees and a reiteration of the public policy 
elements are in order. 
Employee Impact. Professor David Lewin, Director of the 
Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los 
Angeles, has noted that if an inside game "is successful, it will 
cause a decline in productivity and have a negative impact on the 
employer's business just as a strike will. An action that harms the 
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company will harm the workers, too, over the long term....w 
My research has found Lewin to be correct. 
For example, Moog and Schwitzer have been touted as the first 
great success stories of the inside game, and indeed the unions won 
the first round in both. Today, however, employment at the Moog 
St. Louis facility is down to about 250 hourly employees, one-half 
of the number in 1981-82 when the inside game was instituted. Moog 
has moved work from St. Louis to plants in Mississippi and 
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Tennessee which have not been unionized. Meanwhile, Schwitzer went 
farther. It closed its plant at Rolla, Missouri, and moved all the 
work to a nonunion facility in Georgia.1 
The McDonnell Douglas facility at Long Beach, California, was 
a third early test of the inside game. Employment there is now one-
half of what it was earlier, largely of course because of the 
decline in the aerospace business, but the inside game actions 
certainly impacted adversely on the company's ability to compete. 
Colt Firearms saw a long campaign and strike in which the 
union persuaded the Connecticut state senate to urge the federal 
government to revoke the company's contract for the M16 rifle, 
which was done. The union also lobbied police departments not to 
buy Colt firearms. Then, when the company was bought out with state 
help and the strikers returned to their jobs, enough business had 
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been lost so that layoffs and bankruptcy resulted. 
Eastern Air was, of course, totally destroyed by a combination 
corporate campaign, inside game, and strike, with about 30,000 jobs 
lost. Charles Bryan, the local leader of the Machinists union 
commented when the company shut down permanently that it provided 
"a sense of relief" to striking members of the union because "they 
feel they have been liberated in a way." 
John Bavis, who headed the pilots' union at Eastern until he 
was deposed for desiring to call off the strike, had a quite 
different comment: 
... what had started out as a struggle 
to keep Mr. Lorenzo from selling Eastern's assets 
to bolster other parts of his airline empire 
became a personalized confrontation in which some 
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union leaders were determined to get rid of Mr. 
Lorenzo at any cost. At its forefront was Charles 
Bryan, the head of the machinists union [at Eastern] 
and a onetime ally of Eastern. 
Public Policy. Fundamentally/ the union aim is to create a strike 
situation without an overt work stoppage — that is, a strike in 
place. Management is then faced with the need to prevent that 
situation from coming to fruition without sacrificing the essential 
job of operating the plant efficiently, safely,and profitably. 
The basic contrast between a traditional strike and a 
combination corporate campaign and inside game, if successful, is 
that in the latter case, workers continue to receive paychecks and 
unions are not called upon to pay strike benefits, unless employees 
are discharged. Thus, one object of the combination corporate 
campaign — inside game combination is to force the company to 
subsidize a strike against itself. 
The corporate campaign — inside game combination can be a 
powerful union weapon if employees are willing to put their own 
jobs and their company's future at risk. What is involved has been 
succinctly put by Michael Eisenscher, who masterminded an "inside" 
strategy against the PacTel InfoSystems subsidiary of Pacific 
Telesis. He calls his study "Creative Persistent Resistance(CPR) -
-Strategic Options — A Primer for Unions Taking the Strike 
Inside."* This is indeed what the inside game is — a strike 
conducted within the plant. It becomes more potent when combined 
with a corporate campaign which, among its other objectives, is 
designed to gain employee and public sympathy for the union and its 
inside actions. 
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Other labor union supporters acknowledge that the corporate 
campaign—inside game combination are analogous to a strike action. 
Thus, Jerry Tucker, who claims to be the originator of the inside 
game, states: 
In-plant, alternative activities require the same 
commitment to concerted action and solidarity as strikes. 
And, in some ways, are more difficult, although less 
economically punishing, to conduct. Workers will tell you 
that it's much harder to look the boss in the eye on a 
"work-to-rule" programs than it is to carry a picket sign 
a couple of time a week. 
According to an analysis of the current UAW activities at 
Caterpillar by Jack Metzgar, an experienced pro-union student of 
comprehensive corporate campaigns and inside games and the author 
of the, "Running the Plant Backwards", an account of the Moog 
inside game: v 
These new union tactics take awhile to develop and bear 
fruit, but over the long term they can put tremendous 
pressure on a company's ability to manage itself. 
The SEIU Manual states that the basic purpose of the corporate 
campaign inside game combination must be "Costing the Employer 
Money." Employees about to undertake an inside game should ask 
themselves whether they can "reduce productivity? or "increase 
costs?"23 
The inside strike in combination with the corporate campaign 
can be understood and properly dealt with only if such 
comprehensive programs are understood for what they are, that is, 
a strike in fact, especially by management, but also by all 
corporate constituencies including government agencies. Moreover, 
the inside game — corporate campaign form of the strike is still 
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a strike even if it does not achieve the union objectives and is, 
from the union point of view, unsuccessful. This is true of any 
strike. For example, an ordinary strike in which employees leave 
the premises and picket the company facility where they were 
employed is still a strike even though large numbers of the 
employees may cross the picket lines and return to work in defiance 
of the union leadership. As a strike, the corporate campaign — 
inside game combination must be understood as such and treated as 
such if the company targeted is to deal with its consequences and 
to continue as a viable organization. Likewise, employees should 
recognize the combination corporate campaign — inside game for 
what it is, namely, a form of unprotected partial strike which may 
result in discipline, discharge, or even the elimination of their 
jobs. 
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